Some have suggested surprise at our early outs the last two seasons. I did not feel much surprise at an early out, when Embiid quit playing, and Naadir Tharpe was our point guard. I also did not feel surprise at this year’s early out, when Landen Lucas was our starting 5, Perry Ellis was injured going into the game and got punked during the game, and Frank Mason, much as I have grown to love him, was headed to Towson State before coming to KU.
But let’s focus on this season as a microcosm of the problems facing Self and KU for many seasons.
And lets try to get past the surprise of some, and let’s get to the probable cause of the problems some found surprising.
If Self had the weakest front court this season out of his eleven years, and it appears reasonable to say that he did, and if an OAD 4/5 in the weak front court not only struggled to perform even adequately as a substitute the entire season, and he did, and also then has to be removed from suiting up for the team the last month to remain in NCAA compliance regarding eligibility issues, then why would one NOT expect for this team to have had more troubles than any prior team in the Self era, especially when it apparently played as tough, or tougher, of a schedule than any other team in the Self era?
It appears to me that board rats are letting the mind-stings of “inconsistencies” and an early exit obscure the trigger the team’s problems.
The trigger from which a problem plagued season cascaded, does not appear to me to be either how Coach Self schemed and coached the roster he had, or what his players injured and not, suspended and not, did with the schemes he provided them, but rather the roster of players he had to work with.
It was the players, or put more accurately the players he did not have.
This lack of players hardly exonerates Coach Self on its face, for he is, after all, responsible for the players that he attracts to the roster, and those he in effect drives away from it.
But what Coach Self is not entirely responsible for is the players that choose to go elsewhere for reasons unrelated to Coach Self and his staff and facilities.
Self and his staff had a reputation of being exceptional at recruiting, when he and his staff were hired at KU some eleven years ago.
During his tenure, he has attracted some very talented rosters of players to KU and rosters of players that included most of the “pieces” needed for successful teams. The team he inherited his first season had some good, but not NBA grade returning players, but then some obvious missing pieces–players not up to replacing the likes of NBA grade players like Kirk Hinrich and Nick Collison. It showed, though Self made the best of it and won a conference title the first season.
But as the years ensued and more and more of Self’s recruits populated the roster, his teams improved to 27 to 30 game winners going deeper and deeper in the Madness despite some early round upsets by mid majors not at all inconsistent with early round upsets of other elite programs, like Duke.
If I recall correctly, somewhere along there KU shifted to adidas, a Petro ShoeCo sponsoring a small minority of AAU teams where elite players play, and from which agents and agent runners apparently informally influence recruits toward certain of those programs (see Rick Pitino’s comments this season). KU shifted from Nike, a competing PetroShoeCo sponsoring the lion’s share of the AAU teams that elite players play for, and which it is reputed that agents and agent runners also informally influence recruits toward programs for.
KU basketball made a windfall of cash for switching from Nike to adidas–for KUAD. And it shortly won a ring in 2008 with a great deal of apparently originally Nike-leaning talent, something that might not have been necessarily consistent with Nike management’s marketing strategy. After all, why would Nike have wanted players it might have hoped to groom as endorsers to win a Ring for an adidas school instead of for a Nike school? And if I have the chronology incorrect, and KU switched to adidas after the 2008 ring team, why would Nike wish for players it hoped one day to endorse the Nike brand, to continue going to KU, when KU became an adidas contracted school? Do you see the problematic nature of the issue either way?
Regardless, winning the 2008 ring was a moment, when it was logical to expect Self would have a windfall in recruiting. A ring finally allowed Self to be considered among the game’s elite coaches by recruits, at least if recruits valued winning rings, and conference titles, and winning 82% of games played.
And, indeed, Self and KU did appear to start to get recruiting “access” to more highly ranked recruits than before. KU appeared increasingly to make the lists of the most highly ranked players. Most KU fans were cheered by this prospect and readied for Self having as many draft choice grade players as schools like UNC,Duke and some other elite programs were then regularly getting.
But, instead, of a recruiting windfall at this moment, Self began to manifest trouble signing 5 star 5s and 5 star point guards, especially OAD grades of either, that he gained access to recruit. It was around this time that Self also began to have to rely as much, or more, on 3-5 year players, and on formerly highly ranked transfers that either did not like the schools they initially signed with (e.g.,Jeff Withey), or backed out of programs imploding because of scandal (e.g., Xavier Henry, Josh Selby). Though Self was obviously open to recruiting and signing the best 5s and the best point guards, he consistently failed to sign them.
Conspicuously, these elite 5s and point guards did not always sign with other elite programs. Sometimes they signed with less storied and then recently less successful programs and coaches than KU and Self.
These failures were always rationalized one way or another, as KU not having enough PT, or as Self not being willing to promise PT, or Self being too demanding of a coach. This of course contradicted the facts that many of these players were going to play for certain elite programs, like Duke, that had every bit as demanding of coaches, and had lots of talent on hand, while others were choosing to play for all manner of coaches–demanding, not demanding, older, younger, more successful, less successful, nearer their homes, farther from their homes, and so on.
These explanations and rationalizations, whether accurate, or not, in a limited sense, appeared to tend to ignore, marginalize, and rather incompletely explain the dynamic, if any, of Petro ShoeCoes and agents and agent runners on the recruiting process, even though books had been written between 1990 and around 2000 documenting, at least partially, a highly problematic influence of both shoe companies and agents on the recruiting process previously, and there having been no apparent reform of that process broadly engaged in in the years since those books had been written.
Self and KU were hardly without recruiting successes in this period, as the number of draft choices Self and KU produced during the period suggests. But these draft choices conspicuously still did not include a steady flow of elite 5s and elite point guards signing originally with Self and KU that were among the most highly prized recruits both by colleges and the NBA.
KU’s front court players that were high draft choices were exclusively 5s like Jeff Withey and Cole Aldrich that had to play for a number of years to develop into players the NBA wanted to draft with high draft choices, and 4s like Thomas Robinson and the Morris twins, that also had to play 3 years before attracting the interest of the NBA.
KU’s point guard position produced no Top 15 draft choices at all, and few first round choices.
KU’s wings produced first Xavier Henry as an OAD high draft choice, but he reputedly had only attended KU as a second choice to the then imploding Memphis, and even then reputedly entertained the notion of decommitting to KU and recommitting to Kentucky (to which former Memphis Coach John Calipari had moved shortly before the Memphis ineligible player scandal) before finally settling on KU. After Henry, KU then attracted Josh Selby apparently avoiding the impending UTenn implosion under Bruce Pearl, but Selby turned pro and failed to be a high draft choice, then failed to make it in the NBA. Next came BenMac, who had to sit out a season, because of high school academic defficiencies. He blossomed and played brilliantly one season and was drafted highly.
On the heels of BenMac, Self had his one great recruiting class of reputed OAD grade players. Andrew Wiggins, a reputed Nike lean in AAU ball, who signed with KU, starred one season for KU, was drafted Number 1 overall by the NBA, and then signed with adidas as a pro. The second reputed OAD was Wayne Selden, Jr. Selden played, but reputedly struggled with injury, his first season. He played wildly inconsistently his second season. It is unclear at this writing whether he will go pro, but it appears he might not. Joel Embiid, who was signed not as an OAD, but as a probable 2, or 3, year project with a very high ceiling, surprised many and played well enough for the NBA to draft him Number 3 after only one season and with an injured back, too.
The thing to keep in mind about Self’s “best post ring recruiting class” is that even it only included two reputed OADs, while other elite programs were signing 5 or more.
This past season Self had another 2-OAD/TAD recruiting class in a year when Calipari added 5 OAD/TAD types to five returning reputed OAD/TAD types for a total of 10. And Coach K at Duke achieved 9 total OAD/TAD players on his roster.
Self and KU are aligned with adidas.
Calipari-UK and Coach K-Duke are aligned with Nike.
Frankly, Self has never been able to amass enough OAD/TAD recruits that played to a draftable level in a single season to be remotely as talented of a program as UK and Duke since Cal moved to UK.
Self has proven that he can, with less talent, and with the pieces fitting well together, and with favorable match-ups in the Madness, go deep in the Madness one in three or one in four years, which is about as good as anyone does without having the elite 5s and elite point guards on his roster year after year.
It is NOT comparing apples with apple to compare Self with Calipari, Coach K, Roy Williams, Sean Miller, Billy Donovan, Rick Barnes (most seasons) and the last two seasons, Bo Ryan, because they have elite 5s and/or elite point guards on their rosters most every season, while Self does not.
Even Joel Embiid was not an elite 5 while at KU. He just had an enormously high ceiling. And even when he improved dramatically, he was injured a third, or quarter of the season to go and Self had no elite 5 to back him up, as, say, Calipari has three to call on in the event of injury to one this season.
It is even hard to compare Self with Tom Izzo, because though Izzo has struggled in recruiting, he has often landed an elite point guard.
Elite 5s and/or elite point guards are pivotal to being a powerful team likely to go deep in the Madness. They don’t guaranty it, but they are the best insurance. There are exceptions, like KU’s own 2008 ring team, where there was neither. But the pieces have to really fit together well, and there has to be a whole lot of talent on such teams to go deep go deep.
Self has to be compared with other coaches that are coaching without Elite 5s and elite point guards. When he is compared in this way, I would argue that he probably stands head and shoulders above all coaches in this class.
My hypothesis here is this: Self’s problem is that he cannot get enough elite 5s and elite point guards to sign with KU consistently (or at all), because KU is an adidas school with adidas related agents and agent runners that do not provide the right linkages to attract elite 5s and elite point guards.
Now, if a board rat thinks Self SHOULD be able to sign elite 5s and elite point guards, and increasingly an OAD/TAD type player two deep at every position, as Kentucky has done, and Duke has nearly done, then Self needs to be fired immediately, because Self has never shown an ability to do this in his eleven seasons.
To conclude, I think the entire debate about schemes and so forth is intellectually stimulating but utterly inconsequential to solving the problem of making KU make deep runs in the Madness on a more regular basis.
Nothing but a steady run of elite 5s and elite point guards will make that happen consistently. Without them, and with 2-3 OAD/TAD types at the 2, 3 and 4 positions, 1 deep run every 3-5 years is the best we can hope for.